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Toward a Reconceived Legislative
Intent behind the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act
THE PUBLIC-SAFETY RATIONALE FOR
PROHIBITING BRIBERY ABROAD
INTRODUCTION
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) became law in
1977 as an amendment to the 1934 Securities Exchange Act
(Exchange Act).1 This legislation was in part a response to
Watergate and to investigations by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC),2 which revealed that hundreds of U.S.
companies had been bribing foreign officials on a regular basis.3
In light of this discovery, the FCPA made it a crime for U.S.
companies and individuals to bribe foreign government
officials.4 In addition, it imposed requirements on the
accounting procedures and internal control systems of publicly
traded companies.5
Congress addressed foreign bribery by attempting, first,
to deter the bribery of foreign officials by criminalizing it, and
second, to detect such illicit activity by mandating accurate and
detailed records of transactions. This approach reflects the
legislative determination that bribery of foreign government
officials, by certain parties, at least, should not be permitted.
Alongside this admirable objective, however, was a belief that
the law could not entirely ignore business realities. On this
view, it was necessary to permit some bribery, lest the
1 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-231, 91 Stat. 1495 (1977)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (2012)).
2 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE
TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 3 (2012) [hereinafter RESOURCE GUIDE],
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf.
3 Patrick J. Keenan, The Future of the Guiding Principles, in PROCEEDINGS
OF THE ONE HUNDRED FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 301 (2012) (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-640, pt. 4 (1977)).
4 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3.
5 Id. § 78m(b).
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competitiveness of American businesses be substantially
hampered.6
Recognizing that an outright ban on bribery was
inappropriate, Congress drafted an exception to the FCPA’s
anti-bribery provisions. This carve-out permits “facilitating
payments,” small bribes paid to low-level officials to expedite
approvals or permits that would be granted regardless.7 The socalled facilitating payments exception has proved problematic.
Conceptually, the line-drawing required to distinguish
facilitating payments from impermissible bribes often is not
straightforward.8 Practically, the U.S. Department of Justice
(DOJ) and the SEC have, over the past few years of enforcement,
effectively read the facilitating payments exception out of the
statute.9 As various commentators have noted, it is highly
questionable for enforcing agencies to proscribe conduct that
Congress has explicitly permitted.10
Recent DOJ and SEC interpretations of the facilitating
payments exception illustrate a larger trend—the renewed,
vigorous enforcement of the FCPA.11 After the FCPA was
enacted in 1977, enforcement was all but dormant for
decades.12 Beginning in 2006, however, there has been a
marked year-on-year increase in the number of enforcement

6 “Neither I nor my colleagues on this subcommittee have any desire to
unfairly penalize U.S. companies in the competition for foreign markets. Therefore,
some form of international agreement is a necessary corollary to any national
legislation.” Decl. of Prof. Michael J. Koehler in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, United
States v. Carson, No. SA CR 09-00077-JVS, at 23 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2011) [hereinafter
Koehler Declaration] (quoting Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Trade of the
Comm. on Fin., 94th Cong. 10 (1975) (testimony of Sen. Frank Church)).
7 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(b), 78dd-2(b), 78dd-3(b).
8 Michael S. Diamant & Jesenka Mrdjenovic, Don’t You Forget About Me:
The Continuing Viability of the FCPA’s Facilitating Payments Exception, OHIO STATE
L.J. FURTHERMORE 19, 23 (2012), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/
groups/oslj/files/2012/06/Furthermore.Diamant.pdf (“But some of the examples of
qualifying payments provided for by the statute are not necessarily ‘nondiscretionary’ . . . . Nor is the line between discretionary and non-discretionary
functions always clear as a practical matter . . . .”).
9 Id. at 24 (citing TRACE ANTI-BRIBERY COMPLIANCE SOLUTIONS, TRACE
FACILITATION PAYMENTS BENCHMARKING SURVEY
2
(2009),
available
at
http://traceinternational.org/data/public/documents/FacilitationPaymentsSurveyResults64622-1.pdf). The study reported that “more than 70% of surveyed corporations ‘either
never, or only rarely, make facilitation payments, even if their corporate policy permits
facilitation payments.’”
10 Id. at 21.
11 Steve
Frinsko, Recent Trends in Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Enforcement, 55 ADVOCATE 30, 30-31 (2012), available at http://isb.idaho.gov/pdf/
advocate/issues/adv12MarApr.pdf.
12 Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907,
913 (2010).
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actions.13 This increase has been accompanied by a chorus of
criticisms that has grown steadily louder, with a particular
focus on the lack of transparency and predictability with
respect to key terms in the law that trigger liability.14 For
instance, what kind of organization, precisely, is an
“instrumentality” of a foreign government whose employees or
officials cannot receive bribes?15 What additional guidance is there
to flesh out the meaning of “anything of value” that cannot be
given or promised?16 What concepts or rules hem in who may
appropriately be considered a “foreign official”?17
Part I provides a brief history of the FCPA. It then sets
out the key provisions, namely, the anti-bribery provisions, the
books and records provision, the internal controls provision,
and the facilitating payments exception.
Part II argues that a sense of moral ambiguity and
compromise surrounded the passage of the FCPA in 1977.
Drawing on the legislative history, this part notes that foreign
bribery initially was cast mainly as a foreign policy issue. It
then contends that Congress was aware of, but ultimately left
unresolved, certain normative questions as to why, exactly,
bribery is wrong.
Part III turns to China and considers how two
important facets of Chinese culture, guanxi (relationships) and
mianzi (social standing), can affect business dealings and
discusses several important implications for FCPA compliance.
Part IV analyzes three recent examples of FCPA
enforcement actions involving Chinese subsidiaries of U.S.
companies. This part describes violations of the anti-bribery,
books and records, and internal controls provisions of the
FCPA, and of Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act. These case
studies illustrate the types of conduct that the DOJ and SEC
interpret as impermissible under the FCPA.
Part V argues that we ought to recognize the undeniable
and growing threat that corruption poses to public health and
13 See Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-Price, The Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act: Minefield for Directors, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 145, 157-58 (2011).
14 See, e.g., Daniel Chow, China Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
2012 WIS. L. REV. 573 (2012); Nicholas M. McLean, Cross-National Patterns in FCPA
Enforcement, 121 YALE L.J. 1970 (2012); Eric M. Pedersen, The Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act and Its Application to U.S. Business Operations in China, 7 J. INT’L BUS.
& L. 13, 13-15 (2008); F. Joseph Warin et al., FCPA Compliance in China and the Gifts
and Hospitality Challenge, 5 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 33 (2010).
15 Chow, supra note 14, at 606.
16 Id.
17 Id.
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safety as a reason to prohibit foreign bribery. This notion would
help to address the moral ambiguity that undergirds the FCPA
as it stands today. Further, the danger to public health and
safety suggests particular ways in which the FCPA ought to
change. Such a danger also forms a plausible basis for a
reconceived legislative intent for these reforms, which will
likely require legislative action because they diverge from, and
extend beyond, the status quo of FCPA enforcement that the
DOJ and SEC support. Reasonable minds can differ as to what
reforms the public-safety rationale calls for. One possible view,
this note argues, is that these reforms ought to include both a
prohibition against American firms bribing anyone, not just
foreign government officials, and a compliance defense that
operates as a matter of law.
I.

THE FCPA

A.

History

Congress enacted the FCPA in 1977 as an amendment
to the Exchange Act.18 Commentators frequently have cast the
FCPA as a direct result of Watergate.19 That scandal arguably
contributed to a political atmosphere conducive to the FCPA’s
passage, but Congress had already been investigating overseas
bribery and corruption.20 In particular, the SEC conducted a
series of investigations in the mid-1970s,21 in the course of
which over 400 U.S. companies admitted to making
“questionable or illegal payments.”22 More than one-quarter of
these companies belonged to the Fortune 500.23 Investigators
also unearthed slush funds that the companies used to pay
bribes.24 The questionable or illegal payments amounted to

18 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-231, 91 Stat. 1495 (1977)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (2012)).
19 See Koehler, supra note 12, at 911 (quoting Carolyn Lindsey, More Than
You Bargained For: Successor Liability Under the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 959, 961 (2009)) (“The FCPA arose out of the Watergate scandal
in the 1970s. While investigating contributions to Richard Nixon’s re-election
campaign, Congress discovered that over 400 U.S. companies had paid bribes in excess
of $300 million through offshore slush funds in order to win contracts overseas.”).
20 Id.
21 RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 2, at 3.
22 Keenan, supra note 3, at 301 (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-640, pt. 4 (1977)).
23 Id.
24 Nicole Y. Hines, Cultural Due Diligence: The Lost Diligence That Must Be
Found by U.S. Corporations Conducting M&A Deals in China to Prevent Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act Violations, 9 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 19, 22 (2007).
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more than $300 million,25 or approximately $1.2 billion in
today’s dollars.26
After the FCPA was enacted, American companies
immediately found themselves at a disadvantage against
foreign competitors that did not face similar restrictions.27 This
disadvantage persisted for much of the 1990s, when the United
States was the only country to prohibit bribes to foreign
government officials.28 Between April 1994 and May 1995, for
example, the government documented almost 100 instances
where foreign bribes affected the ability of American firms to
secure contracts together worth $45 billion.29 Moreover, foreign
firms willing to engage in bribery won contracts over American
firms 80% of the time.30
Congress amended the FCPA in 198831 and again in
1998.32 The summary below reflects the statute in its current
form after the second set of amendments.
B.

Provisions
1. Anti-Bribery Provisions

The anti-bribery provisions make it unlawful for
certain people and corporations to corruptly offer, give,
promise to give, or authorize the giving of money or anything
of value to foreign officials and other prohibited recipients to
obtain or retain business.33

H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 4.
CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU LAB. STAT., http://www.bls.gov/data/
inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
27 Keenan, supra note 3, at 301.
28 Blake Puckett, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, OPIC, and the Retreat
from Transparency, 15 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 149, 150 (citing JEFFREY P. BIALOS
& GREGORY HUSISIAN, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: COPING WITH
CORRUPTION IN TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES 4 (1997)).
29 Marlise Simons, U.S. Enlists Rich Nations in Move to End Business Bribes,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1996, at A7, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1996/04/12/
world/us-enlists-rich-nations-in-move-to-end-business-bribes.html.
30 Sarah C. Kaczmarek & Abraham L. Newman, The Long Arm of the Law:
Extraterritoriality and the National Implementation of Foreign Bribery Legislation, 65
INT’L ORG. 745, 751 (2011).
31 Title V of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
32 International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.)
(implementing the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business
Transactions).
33 Id. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a).
25
26
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As to givers of bribes, the FCPA prohibits the following
classes of persons from giving, or promising to give, money or
anything of value: (1) issuers34; (2) domestic concerns35; and (3)
persons36 other than issuers and domestic concerns.37
As to recipients of bribes, the FCPA prohibits those
subject to its provisions from giving, or offering to give, money
or anything of value to the following classes of persons: (1)
foreign officials38; (2) any foreign political party or party
official39; (3) any candidate for political office40; (4) any official of
a public international organization41; and (5) any other person
who knows that the payment or promise to pay will be passed
on to one of the preceding types of prohibited recipients.42
Influencing the recipient or gaining an improper
advantage occurs when a person gives a gift or makes a payment
for the purposes of (1) “influencing any act or decision . . . in
[one’s] official capacity”43 ;(2) “inducing . . . any act in violation of
[one’s] lawful duty”44; (3) “securing any improper advantage”45; or
(4) “inducing [the use of one’s] influence . . . to affect or influence

34 Id. § 78dd-1. “Issuers” are defined as “any company whose securities are
registered in the United States or which is required to file periodic reports with the
SEC,” ROBERT W. TARUN, BASICS OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 2 (2006),
available at http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub1287_1.pdf, or any “officer,
director, employee, or agent” acting on behalf of such a company, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a).
35 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2. “Domestic concerns” are defined as “any individual who is
a citizen, national or resident of the United States,” id. § 78dd-2(h)(1)(A), and “any
corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust, unincorporated
organization, or sole proprietorship which has its principal place of business in the United
States, or which is organized under the laws of a State of the United States or a
territory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States,” id. § 78dd-2(h)(1)(B).
36 “Persons” are defined as “any natural person other than a national of the
United States,” id. § 78dd-3(f)(1), as defined in the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8
U.S.C. 1101 (2012). Further, the 1998 amendment to the FCPA extended the antibribery provisions to apply to foreign firms and persons who engage in the proscribed
conduct. RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 2, at 4.
37 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3.
38 Id. §§ 78dd-1(a)(1), 78dd-2(a)(1), 78dd-3(a)(1). “Foreign official” is defined as:

[A]ny officer or employee of a foreign government or any department, agency,
or instrumentality thereof, or of a public international organization, or any
person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such government
or department, agency, or instrumentality, or for or on behalf of any such
public international organization.
Id. §§ 78dd-1(f)(1)(A), 78dd-2(h)(2)(A), 78dd-3(f)(2)(A).
39 Id. §§ 78dd-1(a)(2), 78dd-2(a)(2), 78dd-3(a)(2).
40 Id.
41 Id. §§ 78dd-1(f)(1)(A), 78dd-2(h)(2)(A), 78dd-3(f)(2)(A).
42 Id. §§ 78dd-1(a)(3), 78dd-2(a)(3), 78dd-3(a)(3).
43 Id. §§ 78dd-1(a)(1)-(2), 78dd-2(a) (1)-(2), 78dd-3(a)(1)-(2).
44 Id.
45 Id.
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any act or decision of [a foreign] government or instrumentality.”46
The DOJ enforces the anti-bribery provisions through civil and
criminal penalties.47
2. Books and Records and Internal Controls Provisions
The FCPA imposes two categories of accounting
requirements. The first category is set forth in the books and
records provision, which requires issuers to “make and keep
books, records,48 and accounts, which, in reasonable detail,
accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of
the assets of the issuer . . . .”49 “Reasonable detail” is defined as
“such level of detail . . . as would satisfy prudent officials in the
conduct of their own affairs.”50 It is important to note that
“accurately” does not require “exact precision,” but the records
should “reflect transactions in conformity with generally
accepted accounting principles or other applicable criteria.”51
The second category is set forth in the internal controls
provision, which requires issuers to “devise and maintain a
system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide
reasonable assurances” of compliance.52
Together, the books and records and internal controls
provisions give “the SEC authority over the entire financial
management and reporting requirements of publicly held United
States corporations.”53 The SEC enforces the books and records
and internal controls provisions through civil penalties.54
3. The Facilitating Payments Exception
Since its passage in 1977, the FCPA has excluded
certain foreign payments from the anti-bribery provisions. The
current language was added as part of the 1988 amendments.
Id.
Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of Its
Decade of Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REV. 389, 395 (2010).
48 The Exchange Act defines “records” to include “accounts, correspondence,
memorandums, tapes, discs, papers, books, and other documents or transcribed
information of any type, whether expressed in ordinary or machine language.” 15
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(37). Adding the words “books” and “accounts” broadens the scope of the
recordkeeping required under the FCPA.
49 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A).
50 Id. § 78m(b)(7).
51 S. REP. No. 95-114, at 8 (1977).
52 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B).
53 SEC. v. World-Wide Coin Investments, Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724, 746 (N.D.
Ga. 1983).
54 Koehler, supra note 47, at 396.
46
47
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When Congress enacted them, however, “[b]oth houses insisted
that their proposed amendments only clarified ambiguities
‘without changing the basic intent or effectiveness of the law.’”55
As such, these amendments simply made “the facilitating
payments [exception] an express part of the statute.”56
The statute now removes from the scope of the FCPA
“any facilitating or expediting payment to a foreign official,
political party, or party official the purpose of which is to expedite
or to secure the performance of a routine governmental action by
a foreign official, political party, or party official.”57 In addition,
the statute defines the term “routine governmental action” with a
non-exhaustive list of exempted payments.58 But the statute
provides this qualification:
[T]he term . . . does not include any decision by a foreign official
whether, or on what terms, to award new business to or to continue
business with a particular party, or any action taken by a foreign official
involved in the decisionmaking process to encourage a decision to award
new business to or continue business with a particular party.59

II.

MORAL AMBIGUITY AND THE FCPA

This part argues that a sense of moral ambiguity and
compromise surrounded the passage of the FCPA in 1977. The
legislative history reveals that, in the early stages, lawmakers
viewed foreign bribery as an undesirable source of conflict between
the United States and foreign governments. They feared, however,
55 United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 750 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing S. REP. No.
100-85, at 54 (1987); H.R. REP. No. 100-40, pt. 2, at 77 (1987)).
56 Diamant & Mrdjenovic, supra note 8, at 22.
57 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(f)(2), 78dd-2(h)(3), 78dd-3(f)(3).
58 Id. §§ 78dd-1(f)(3)(A)(i)-(v), 78dd-2(h)(4)(A), 78dd-3(f)(4)(A). These sections
of the United States Code elaborate as follows:

The term “routine governmental action” means only an action which is
ordinarily and commonly performed by a foreign official in—
(i) obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents to qualify a person
to do business in a foreign country;
(ii) processing governmental papers, such as visas and work orders;
(iii) providing police protection, mail pick-up and delivery, or scheduling
inspections associated with contract performance or inspections related to
transit of goods across country;
(iv) providing phone service, power and water supply, loading and unloading
cargo, or protecting perishable products or commodities from deterioration; or
(v) actions of a similar nature.
59

Id. §§ 78dd-1(f)(3)(B), 78dd-2(h)(4)(B), 78dd-3(f)(4)(B).
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that prohibiting bribery would put American firms at a
disadvantage. Closer to the time the FCPA was enacted, normative
rationales rejecting bribery as immoral gained prominence.
Ultimately, Congress took a balanced approach that did not resolve
the question of why bribery is wrong, and that recognized the
necessity of limited amounts of foreign bribery.
A.

Arguments for and against Legislative Action

Congress grappled over an interrelated set of
considerations for and against taking legislative action. This is
evident in the House report,60 the Senate report,61 and the House
conference report62 associated with S. 305 and H.R. 3815, the two
bills that led to the FCPA as enacted. These documents focused
on the perceived moral repugnancy of bribery and are discussed
below. Although this consideration was a recurring thread
throughout the legislative process, foreign bribery initially was
cast mainly as a foreign policy issue.
With respect to foreign policy, Congress was concerned
that misconduct by American firms would affect relationships
between the United States and foreign governments. Moreover,
there was the worry that paying off foreign officials would
harm America’s standing abroad, serving as a tacit admission
that capitalism was flawed or unworkable, that fair
competition based on price and quality, not on greased palms,
was a story for the gullible. George Ball, a Democrat, described
the setback that would result from the battle for hearts and
minds: “This is a problem that, like so many others, has relevance
in the struggle of antagonistic ideologies; for, when our
enterprises stoop to bribery and kickbacks, they give substance to
the communist myth . . . that capitalism is fundamentally
corrupt.”63 In this way, the legislative history suggests that
Congress was motivated, in part, by the goal of “promoting values
and building alliances through the active, deliberate exportation
of anticorruption norms.”64
Running counter to arguments in favor of legislative
action was an obvious danger—cracking down on foreign
H.R. REP. No. 95-640 (1977).
S. REP. No. 95-114 (1977).
62 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 94-831 (1977).
63 Foreign and Corporate Bribes: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Banking,
Hous., & Urb. Aff., 94th Cong. 41-42 (1976) (statement of George Ball, Lehman Brothers)
(quoted in Andrew Brady Spalding, The Irony of International Business Law: U.S.
Progressivism and China’s New Laissez-Faire, 59 UCLA L. REV. 354, 373-74 (2011)).
64 Spalding, supra note 63, at 373.
60
61
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bribery would handicap American firms. Other things being
equal, American firms would lose out to foreign firms that had
deep pockets and were willing to reach into them. This concern
explains why, from the beginning, discussions concerning
foreign bribery included the importance of convincing other
countries to adopt similar rules. On October 6, 1975, at a
hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on International
Trade of the Committee on Finance, Senator Frank Church
emphasized the need for an international agreement to
accompany any U.S. legislation.65 Several months later, before the
Subcommittee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the
International Chamber of Commerce testified that without
international cooperation, prohibitions on foreign bribery “could,
and in some cases would, mitigate [sic] severely against U.S.
business and prevent it from being able to compete effectively
in quite substantial markets of the world.”66
B.

Justifications for the FCPA as Enacted in 1977

The legislative history most useful to understanding the
FCPA as it was enacted in 1977 consists of the Senate report
accompanying S. 305, the House report accompanying H.R.
3815, and President Carter’s signing statement. Both reports
articulate the notion that bribery has no place in business
predicated on fair competition.67 Both also refer to the manner
in which foreign bribery initially was framed—as a foreign
policy issue.68 Specifically, the worry focused on the harm that
could—and indeed, did—result to relationships between the
United States and foreign governments. An oft-cited example is
the revelation that Lockheed Martin had bribed foreign
officials in Japan, the Netherlands, and Italy for government
business.69 Understandably, the peoples of these countries
reacted unfavorably to the news and placed “intense pressure”
on the officials to explain themselves.70 That the company
65 Senator Church disassociated himself and the subcommittee from “any desire
to unfairly penalize U.S. companies in the competition for foreign markets.” Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Int’l Trade of the Comm. on Fin., 94th Cong. 10 (1975) (testimony of Sen.
Frank Church) (quoted in Koehler Declaration, supra note 6, at 23).
66 Foreign and Corporate Bribes: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Banking,
Hous., & Urb. Aff., 94th Cong. 39, 49 (1976) (testimony of Sen. Frank Church).
67 See S. REP. No. 95-114, at 4 (1977); H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 4 (1977).
68 See S. REP. No. 95-114, at 3; H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 5.
69 Bruce W. Klaw, A New Strategy for Preventing Bribery and Extortion in
International Business Transactions, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 303, 307 (2012).
70 S. REP. No. 95-114, at 3 (1977).
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involved was American led to “concomitant diplomatic
problems for the United States.”71
The legislative history also considers normative rationales
that reject bribery as immoral. Senate report 95-114 quotes
Secretary of State W. Michael Blumenthal, who testified that
bribery was “morally repugnant and illegal in most
countries . . . .”72 The report concludes its section on the need for
legislation by stating, “[a] strong antibribery law is urgently
needed to bring these corrupt practices to a halt and to restore
public confidence in the integrity of the American business
system.”73 House report 95-640 describes the bribery of foreign
officials as “unethical”74 and “counter to the moral expectations
and values of the American public.”75 It continues, “[foreign
bribery] rewards corruption instead of efficiency and puts
pressure on ethical enterprises to lower their standards or risk
losing business.”76 In his signing statement, President Carter
wrote, “I share Congress [sic] belief that bribery is ethically
repugnant and competitively unnecessary.”77
C.

Congress’s Balanced Approach and the Facilitating
Payments Exception

It is striking that the legislative history is replete with
statements that bribery is wrong, but nearly devoid of
explanations as to why. The quotations above are representative
in that they advance a moral position that is seemingly selfevident and axiomatic. Some commentators have attributed the
motivation behind passing the FCPA to the Puritan religious
worldview of the settlers, which “fundamentally influenced the
American sense of morality.”78 Professors George and Lacey
suggest that the Puritan notion equating success in business
71 Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Int’l Econ. Pol’y & Trade, 95th Cong. 8
(1975) (testimony of Rep. Robert C. Eckhardt) (quoted in Koehler Declaration, supra
note 6, at 81).
72 S. REP. No. 95-114, at 4.
73 Id.
74 H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 4 (1977).
75 Id.
76 Id. at 5.
77 Jimmy Carter, Foreign Corrupt Practices and Investment Disclosure Bill;
Statement on Signing S. 305 into Law, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2157 (Dec. 20, 1977), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=7036 (quoted in Koehler, supra note
12, at 913).
78 Barbara Crutchfield George & Kathleen A. Lacey, A Coalition of
Industrialized Nations, Developing Nations, Multilateral Development Banks, and NonGovernmental Organizations: A Pivotal Complement to Current Anti-Corruption
Initiatives, 33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 547, 554-55 (2000).
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with “proof of divine favor” was the underlying cause of a
“righteous indignation” against those who appear not to play by
the rules.79 This is a plausible explanation, but it is difficult to
prove and at least one commentator is not persuaded.80
Alternatively, Congress may have believed that bribery
was objectionable because of its adverse consequences. Foreign
payments may be wrong because they run afoul of a certain
conception of fair competition in business. Or they may be
wrong because they turn friendly relationships between the
United States and foreign governments into something decidedly
less so. Unfortunately, there is no clear indication in the
legislative history that ties the condemnations of bribery as
“morally repugnant”81 to these rationales for addressing foreign
bribery. Insofar as divining legislative intent, such a
consequentialist view does not give a clear answer.
There are, however, reasons to believe that Congress
was aware of some of the conceptual difficulties when thinking
about bribery in moral terms. The first, noted above, is the lack
of affirmative explanations for why bribery is wrong. The second
is the recognition of how difficult it is to legislate against a
phenomenon—i.e., bribery of the sort that we feel should not be
permitted—whose contours are difficult to define.82
There is a third reason to believe that Congress struggled
with and left unresolved the moral ambiguity surrounding
bribery—the FCPA’s facilitating payments exception, which
permits small bribes for “routine governmental action.” This is
not to say that the carve-out was purely the result of conceptual
confusion. Rather, the exception may best be understood as
Id.
See Elizabeth Spahn, International Bribery: The Moral Imperialism
Critiques, 18 MINN. J. INT’L L. 155, 170-71 (2009) (noting that Professors George and
Lacey point to no supporting evidence in the legislative debates that American Puritan
ethics were a motivating factor behind the FCPA).
81 S. REP. No. 95-114, at 6 (1977).
82 Statements by William Simon, Secretary of the Treasury, before the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, are illustrative. Asked by
Senator Proxmire for his thoughts on S. 3133, Secretary Simon responded: “[I]t’s very
difficult to put it down on paper in statutory language that would not be damaging to
some other legitimate things . . . . It’s almost like the Justice who said that he can’t
define pornography, but he knows what it is when he sees it.” Koehler Declaration,
supra note 6, at 31 (quoting Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban
Aff., 94th Cong. 1 (1976) (testimony of William Simon, Secretary of the Treasury)). The
following month, Senator Proxmire expressed a related frustration at a hearing before
the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. He stated, “[S]omehow we can’t
bring ourselves, at least the executive branch can’t seem to bring itself to a clear-cut
definition of this action as illegal and then take effective action to prevent it.” Id. at 39
(quoting Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Aff., 94th Cong. 2
(1976) (testimony of Sen. William Proxmire)).
79
80
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stemming from three related causes—moral ambiguity
surrounding bribery; a concern that the FCPA was an exercise
of moral imperialism by the United States; but the belief that
certain, arguably de minimis, forms of bribery were necessary
for conducting business.
III.

CHINA

This part turns to China and recognizes its importance
to the United States as a trade partner and as an enormous
growth market. It then describes the cultural notions of guanxi
(relationships) and mianzi (social standing). Together, guanxi
and mianzi emphasize the need to build personal relationships,
to reciprocate in exchanging gifts and favors, and to cultivate
and leverage one’s reputation. Lastly, this part considers some
of the ways in which Chinese culture complicates conducting
business while complying with the FCPA.
A.

The Importance of China

It is difficult to overstate China’s importance to the
United States, both as a trade partner and as an enormous
growth market. China is the second-largest trade partner of the
United States, surpassed only by Canada.83 In 2009, China took
Germany’s place as both the world’s third-largest economy84
and the world’s largest exporter.85 The following year, China
made headlines when it unseated Japan as the world’s secondlargest economy,86 a title Japan had held for more than 40
years.87 China is predicted to become the world’s largest

83 Foreign Trade—Top Trading Partners, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 2013),
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/toppartners.html.
84 Ashley Seager, China Becomes World’s Third-Largest Economy, GUARDIAN,
Jan. 14, 2009, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/jan/14/china-worldeconomic-growth.
85 China ‘Overtakes Germany as World’s Largest Exporter,’ BBC NEWS (Jan.
10, 2010, 10:05 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8450434.stm.
86 David Barboza, China Passes Japan as Second-Largest Economy, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 15, 2010, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/16/business/
global/16yuan.html.
87 Justin McCurry & Julia Kollewe, China Overtakes Japan As World’s SecondLargest Economy, GUARDIAN, Feb. 14, 2011, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/
business/2011/feb/14/china-second-largest-economy. But it is worth noting that “the rapid
overtaking of the Japanese economy also reflects years of disappointing growth there.”
China: Second in Line, ECONOMIST FREE EXCH. BLOG (Aug. 16, 2010, 1:36 PM),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2010/08/china_0.
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importer by 2014.88 Given America’s imports were six times
those of China in 2000,89 this is a remarkable turnaround.
Moreover, China’s retail sales could exceed America’s by
2014.90 This estimate is no doubt because of the Chinese middle
class, who earn between $10,000 and $60,000 per year.91 This
demographic, estimated to include between 250 and 300 million
people,92 is already roughly as large as the entire population of
the United States.93 The Chinese middle class may grow to
between 700 and 800 million people, or more than half of the
entire population of China.94
Given the significant trade relationship between the
United States and China, and the continued growth of the
Chinese middle class, the Chinese market is of profound
importance to American firms. Moreover, the conditions in China
provide a useful stress test for the FCPA and its problematic
provisions.
B.

How Chinese Culture Complicates FCPA Compliance
1. Guanxi

Generally, guanxi refers to informal, long-term personal
relationships95 somewhat similar to the Western concepts of
connections and networking.96 Guanxi can refer both to specific
relationships a person has with another individual or group of
individuals, and to the bundle of relationships to which a

88 Economics Focus: How to Get a Date, ECONOMIST, Dec. 31, 2011, available
at http://www.economist.com/node/21542155.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Tami Luhby, China’s Growing Middle Class, CNN MONEY (Apr. 26, 2012, 6:00
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/04/25/news/economy/china-middle-class/index.htm (quoting
one expert’s view on the salary range of China’s middle class).
92 MICHAEL ANDREW & PENG YALI, THE RISE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS IN ASIAN
EMERGING MARKETS 2 (Apr. 2012), available at http://www.kpmg.com/CN/en/
IssuesAndInsigts/ArticlesPublications/Documents/Middle-Class-Asia-EmergingMarkets-201206-2.pdf.
93 The United States Census Bureau estimated the population of the United
States to be approximately 316 million in 2013. State and County QuickFacts—USA, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU (June 27, 2013, 1:52 PM), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/
00000.html.
94 Luhby, supra note 91.
95 Yi Zhang & Zigang Zhang, Guanxi and Organizational Dynamics in China: A
Link Between Individual and Organizational Levels, 67 J. BUS. ETHICS 375, 375 (2006).
96 Patricia Pattison & Daniel Herron, The Mountains Are High and the
Emperor is Far Away: Sanctity of Contract in China, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 459, 484 (2003).
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person is a party, i.e., his or her “network.”97 But to appreciate
the breadth of guanxi, it is important to understand how it
differs from networking. At its core, guanxi is a social
undertaking that arises from being part of a larger society.98
The reason why guanxi pervades all aspects of Chinese society
stems from its origins in Confucianism,99 which emerged
between the fourth and fifth centuries B.C.100 Since that time,
Confucianism as a social philosophy has espoused values of
“duty, loyalty, honor, filial piety, kindness, sincerity, and
respect for age and seniority.”101 To this day, Confucianism
endures as a principal source of community values in China.102
At a minimum, guanxi consists of “mutual obligations,
assurances, and understanding.”103 Often, but not always, guanxi
relationships—especially those between family members, friends,
and business associates—entail some measure of emotional
attachment or sympathy.104 For example, the extent to which two
individuals get along and find common ground can determine
the strength of their guanxi.105 While emotional attachment
may or may not play a role in a given guanxi relationship, the
sense of mutual indebtedness that results from exchanging
gifts and favors is crucial.106 Both the need to reciprocate and
the fact that repayment is often unequal serve to perpetuate
the relationship.107
It is common to conceive of guanxi as concentric circles
that surround the individual. In the innermost circle are family
members, by both marriage and birth.108 This reflects the role
in Chinese culture of the family as the primary collective to
which one belongs.109 Beyond the innermost circle are non97 See Comprehensive Chinese-English Dictionary, NCIKU, http://www.nciku.com/
search/zh/detail/关系/1305381 (last visited Mar. 1, 2014) (defining guanxi as
“relationship” and “relations”).
98 See Jane Tung, Guanxi and Ethics: A Study of Chinese Management
Behaviour, 9 AM. J. APPLIED SCIS. 223, 223 (2012) (“Guanxi in China is recognized as a
major activity in its world of business as well as the [sic] society.”).
99 Zhang & Zhang, supra note 95, at 378.
100 Gary Kok Yew Chan, The Relevance and Value of Confucianism in
Contemporary Business Ethics, 77 J. BUS. ETHICS 347, 347 (2008).
101 Pattison & Herron, supra note 96, at 478.
102 Chan, supra note 100, at 347-48.
103 Seung Ho Park & Yadong Luo, Guanxi and Organizational Dynamics:
Organizational Networking in Chinese Firms, 22 STRAT. MGMT. J. 455, 455 (2001).
104 Chris Provis, “Guanxi” and Conflicts of Interest, 79 J. BUS. ETHICS 57, 58 (2008).
105 Tung, supra note 98, at 224.
106 Pattison & Herron, supra note 96, at 485.
107 Hines, supra note 24, at 56.
108 Id.
109 Pattison & Herron, supra note 96, at 483.
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family members, such as friends, acquaintances, coworkers,
and business associates.110 The distance of a non-family
member from the innermost circle depends on the nature of the
affiliation and level of trust he or she shares with the
individual.111 In the outermost circle are strangers, with whom
the individual shares no guanxi.112 The Chinese generally feel
no sense of obligation toward strangers.113
2. Mianzi
Mianzi, which translates into English as “face,”114 refers
to an individual’s “public self-image.”115 It is a measure of social
standing116 determined by various factors, such as one’s “post,
credibility, reputation, power, income, or network.”117 The
Chinese strive to maintain mianzi in the eyes of others to
enhance their “reputation, recognition, and status.”118 One’s
success in maintaining mianzi shapes his or her ability to
cultivate and grow a guanxi network.119 More broadly, each
individual’s relative position helps to maintain social order by
indicating what is appropriate behavior for that individual.120
The concept of social currency is helpful when thinking
about how mianzi operates. To the Chinese, social status is
something that can be measured, at least in relative terms.121
Thus, one may have “a lot of face (mianzi da), not much face
Hines, supra note 24, at 56.
Zhang & Zhang, supra note 95, at 378 (citing MAYFAIR MEI-HUI YANG,
GIFTS, FAVORS, AND BANQUETS: THE ART OF SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS IN CHINA (1994)).
112 See Zhang & Zhang, supra note 95, at 378-79 (rejecting the view that one
can share guanxi with strangers because “common identity or an intermediary . . . is
necessary in initiating Guanxi . . . .”).
113 Hines, supra note 24, at 57.
114 Id.
115 Peter W. Cardon & James Calvert Scott, Chinese Business Face:
Communication Behaviors and Teaching Approaches, 66 BUS. COMM. Q. 9, 9 (2003)
(quoting PENELOPE BROWN & STEPHEN C. LEVINSON, POLITENESS: SOME UNIVERSALS
IN LANGUAGE USAGE (2d ed. 1987)).
116 Id. at 12 (citing Hsien Chin Hu, The Chinese Concepts of “Face”, 46 AM.
ANTHROPOLOGIST 45 (1944); WENSHAN JIA, THE REMAKING OF THE CHINESE
CHARACTER AND IDENTITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2001)) (“To have a lot of face
essentially means that one has high status compared to others, whereas not to have
much face or to have no face means to have low status.”).
117 Park & Luo, supra note 103, at n.1.
118 Victor P. Lau et al., Entrepreneurial Career Success from a Chinese
Perspective: Conceptualization, Operationalization, and Validation, 38 J. INT’L BUS.
STUD. 126, 137 (2007).
119 Park & Luo, supra note 103, at n.1.
120 Hines, supra note 24, at 57.
121 Cardon & Scott, supra note 115, at 12 (citing Hsien Chin Hu, The Chinese
Concepts of “Face”, 46 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 45 (1944); WENSHAN JIA, THE REMAKING
OF THE CHINESE CHARACTER AND IDENTITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2001)).
110
111
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(mianzi xiao), no face (mei mianzi), or more face than others (ta
de mianzi bijiao da).”122 The currency metaphor goes further.
One can gain face (zengjia mianzi) or lose it (diu mianzi).123 For
example, an individual may gain face by succeeding in business
or by being associated with high-status individuals.124 On the
other hand, he or she may lose face by “not keeping promises,
meeting expectations, or disregarding social norms.”125
Examples of behavior that result in losing face include directly
contradicting a superior in front of a third party, speaking out
of turn, or failing to return a favor. One can also lend or borrow
face (jie mianzi).126 For example, an individual has borrowed face
when he or she receives an introduction or a favor only because
someone of higher status has intervened. The Chinese also think
of face as something that can be protected (baohu mianzi), saved
(liu mianzi), and given (gei mianzi) to enhance or acknowledge
the face of others.127
3. The Implications of Guanxi and Mianzi for FCPA
Compliance
The concepts of guanxi and mianzi, as well as other
facets of Chinese culture, encourage the Chinese to maintain
and foster harmony.128 The desire to avoid conflict has
implications for business generally. Individuals may avoid
“evaluation and constructive criticism.”129 An aversion to
confrontation may keep unproductive employees from being
dismissed and unprofitable companies from failing.130 As
mentioned above, guanxi and mianzi require a mutually shared
sense of obligation to sustain relationships. Professor Potter has
described the dilemma as “not merely a matter of suspending
moral or legal values,” but as reflecting “uncertainties and tensions
as to the permissible parameters for guanxi behavior and the
parameters for formal institutional behavior.”131 In other words, an
Id.
Id.
124 Id.
125 Hines, supra note 24, at 58.
126 Id. at 13.
127 Cardon & Scott, supra note 115, at 14.
128 Pattison & Herron, supra note 96, at 488.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Provis, supra note 104, at 63 (quoting P. B. Potter, Guanxi and the PRC
Legal System: From Contradiction to Complementarity, in SOCIAL CONNECTIONS IN
CHINA: INSTITUTIONS, CULTURE, AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF GUANXI (T. Gold et al.,
eds.) 179-95 (2002)).
122
123
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important ethical question is how guanxi “obligations are related to
other ethical and moral commitments people have.”132
More specifically, American firms face a high risk of
violating the FCPA when they try to adhere to the Chinese
customs of guanxi and mianzi.133 This is in large part because
“bribery is related to the gift-giving ethos in China.”134 Gifts,
particularly in Chinese culture, show that a relationship is
valued and are expressions of respect for the recipient.135 The
need for reciprocity that attaches to gift giving follows from the
principle of li—Confucian ritual action.136 Professor Tian has
suggested, however, that bringing expensive gifts to superiors to
show respect or to request special privileges reflects “a transition
from the ritual action ‘Li’ to the secular Li,” i.e., a gift.137
An everyday application of these Chinese customs may
easily violate the FCPA. Professor Hines describes one of these
possibilities:
Imagine a scenario where X, an employee in a Chinese subsidiary,
borrows the face of Y, a family member of Z, in order to be introduced
to Z, a foreign official, who then offers X a major contract or other
business deal. However, in order to [sic] for the deal to go through, Z
insists that X pay Y a large “service fee.” In China, such a payment is
viewed as maintaining and building guanxi (network/connections).
However, under the FCPA a violation has occurred because X, an
employee in a Chinese subsidiary, has bribed a foreign official, Z. Even
though Z did not receive the payment himself, he received a benefit from
Y receiving the payment. Thus, Z has received a “thing of value” under
the Act.138

IV.

RECENT ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS IN CHINA

To elaborate on the preceding discussion of guanxi and
mianzi, this part provides concrete examples of behavior that is
common when doing business in China, but that violates the
FCPA. The case studies concern three U.S. companies with
Chinese subsidiaries—Eli Lilly and Company, International
Business Machines Corporation, and Maxwell Technologies,
Inc. The DOJ, the SEC, or both have charged these companies
Id. at 58.
Hines, supra note 24, at 21-22.
134 Qing Tian, Perception of Business Bribery in China: The Impact of Moral
Philosophy, 80 J. BUS. ETHICS 437, 438 (2008).
135 Id. at 443.
136 Id. (citing QING TIAN, A TRANSCULTURAL STUDY OF ETHICAL PERCEPTIONS
AND JUDGMENTS BETWEEN CHINESE AND GERMAN BUSINESSMEN (2004)).
137 Id.
138 Hines, supra note 24, at n.190.
132
133
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and/or their subsidiaries with violating the anti-bribery, books
and records, and internal controls provisions of the FCPA, and
Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act. These case studies form part
of the trend, in recent years, of China being a “significant
demand-side country” for FCPA violations.139 Indeed, nearly
one-third of FCPA enforcement actions in 2012 involved
improprieties in China.140
A.

Eli Lilly and Company

Eli Lilly and Company (Lilly) operates in more than 143
countries141 and manufactures drugs for treating, among other
things, diabetes,142 pancreatic cancer,143 and osteoporosis.144
From 2000 to 2009, Lilly foreign subsidiaries made improper
payments not only in China, but also in Brazil, Poland, and
Russia.145 In China, Lilly has a wholly owned subsidiary (LillyChina) whose sales representatives targeted governmentemployed health-care providers.146
Between 2006 and 2009,147 there were widespread and
repeated instances of Lilly-China employees submitting false
expense reports and then using the reimbursed amounts to pay
for improper gifts and benefits.148 The recipients were primarily
government-employed physicians,149 who received wine, specialty
foods, jewelry, cosmetics, meals, and visits to bathhouses and
karaoke bars.150 In addition, government officials who could
improve sales in China by placing Lilly products on “government
reimbursement lists” received cigarettes, meals, and spa
139 SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, FCPA DIGEST: RECENT TRENDS AND PATTERNS IN
ENFORCEMENT OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 7 (2012), available at
http://www.shearman.com/files/Publication/bb1a7bff-ad52-4cf9-88b9-9d99e001dd5f/
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/6ec0766a-25aa-41ec-8731-041a672267a6/FCPADigest-Trends-and-Patterns-Jan2012.pdf.
140 G IBSON , D UNN & C RUTCHER LLP, 2012 Y EAR -E ND FCPA U PDATE 25
(2013),
available
at
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/
2012YearEndFCPAUpdate.pdf.
141 Complaint ¶ 5, SEC v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 1:12-cv-02045 (D.D.C. Dec. 20,
2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2012/comp-pr2012-273.pdf.
142 See Human, Eli Lilly & Co., http://www.lilly.com/products/human/Pages/
human.aspx (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
143 See GEMZAR, http://pi.lilly.com/us/gemzar.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
144 See
About Forteo, FORTEO, http://www.forteo.com/Pages/osteoporosismedication.aspx (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
145 Complaint ¶¶ 1-2, SEC v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 1:12-cv-02045.
146 Id. ¶ 16.
147 Id. ¶ 2.
148 Id. ¶¶ 17-20.
149 Id. ¶¶ 17-19.
150 Id. ¶¶ 18-19.
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treatments.151 In response, Lilly has dismissed or disciplined
employees who engaged in this prohibited conduct.152
As a result of these improprieties, the SEC charged
Lilly-China with violating the books and records provision by
falsifying expense reports and then using the reimbursed
amounts to pay for perquisites.153 The SEC also charged Lilly
with violating the internal controls provision, which requires
the company to “devise and maintain an adequate system of
internal accounting.”154 First, the SEC alleged, Lilly relied on
written assurances from Lilly-China employees that they were
not giving improper gifts to obtain or retain business.155 Second,
Lilly’s audit department lacked procedures for ensuring that
foreign transactions complied with the FCPA.156
Without admitting to wrongdoing, Lilly “consented to
the entry of a final judgment permanently enjoining the
company from violating the . . . books and records[ ] and
internal control[ ] provisions of the FCPA.”157 Moreover, Lilly
agreed to disgorge approximately $13.9 million in ill-gotten
gains, pay approximately $6.7 million in prejudgment interest,
and pay a penalty of $8.7 million.158
B.

International Business Machines Corporation

International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) is a
multinational technology and consulting company operating in
more than 170 countries.159 IBM manufactures, configures, and
sells a variety of products, which include IT infrastructure
services, enterprise-level software, point-of-sale retail systems,
semiconductors, and data storage products.160 IBM (China)
Investment Company Limited and IBM Global Services (China)
Co., Ltd. (collectively, IBM-China) are wholly owned subsidiaries
of IBM.161 From 2004 to 2009,162 employees of IBM-China created
Id. ¶ 20.
Id. ¶ 21.
153 Id. ¶ 44.
154 Id. ¶¶ 45-46.
155 Id. ¶ 45.
156 Id. ¶ 46.
157 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Eli Lilly and
Company with FCPA Violations (Dec. 20, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/
PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171487116.
158 Id.
159 IBM, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 25 (2012), available at http://www.ibm.com/
annualreport/2012/bin/assets/2012_ibm_annual.pdf.
160 Id. at 21-24.
161 Complaint ¶ 3, SEC v. IBM Corp., No. 1:11-cv-00563 (D.D.C. Mar. 18,
2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011/comp21889.pdf.
151
152
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slush funds, some at local travel agencies to pay for overseas
trips, and others to provide improper gifts, such as cash payments
and consumer electronics.163 Chinese government officials
received both overseas trips and improper gifts.164 IBM-China
entered into contracts with “government-owned or controlled
customers in China” to provide training on how to use IBM
hardware and software.165 IBM held some of this training offsite.166 Certain trips deviated from preapproved itineraries, which
detailed a trip’s business purpose and “sightseeing and
entertainment activities.”167 Other trips did not have preapproved
itineraries at all, and had little to no business content or provided
per diem payments.168
The SEC charged IBM “with violating the books and
records and internal control provisions of the . . . FCPA.”169 During
the period in question, IBM had policies prohibiting bribery and
addressing FCPA compliance.170 But on more than 100 occasions,
trips that did not follow preapproved itineraries or were otherwise
objectionable somehow escaped detection.171 In this manner, “IBM
failed to devise and maintain a system of internal accounting
controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances, among other
things, that . . . transactions were executed in accordance with
management’s general or specific authorization . . . .”172 IBM-China
also designated certain travel agents as “authorized training
providers” and paid them for “training services.”173 These sums
paid for trips that lacked preapproved itineraries.174 The SEC
alleged that IBM-China violated the books and records provision by
recording improper payments as legitimate business expenses.175
Like Lilly, IBM did not admit to wrongdoing and
“consented to the entry of a final judgment that permanently
enjoins the company from violating the books and records and

Id. ¶ 3.
Id. ¶ 32.
164 Id.
165 Id. ¶ 33.
166 Id.
167 Id. ¶¶33-34
168 Id. ¶ 34.
169 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, IBM to Pay $10 Million in
Settled FCPA Enforcement Action (Mar. 18, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/litreleases/2011/lr21889.htm.
170 Complaint ¶ 4, SEC v. IBM Corp., No. 1:11-cv-00563.
171 Id. ¶ 34.
172 Id. ¶ 40.
173 Id. ¶ 34.
174 Id.
175 Id. ¶ 6.
162
163
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internal control provisions of the FCPA . . . .”176 Moreover, IBM
agreed to disgorge approximately $5.3 million in ill-gotten
gains and pay $2.7 million in prejudgment interest.177
C.

Maxwell Technologies, Inc.

Maxwell Technologies, Inc. (Maxwell), a Delaware
corporation headquartered in California,178 manufactures
energy storage and power delivery products.179 Maxwell
Technologies S.A. (Maxwell SA) is a wholly owned Swiss
subsidiary.180 Maxwell SA employed a Chinese national as a
third-party agent who marketed and sold Maxwell’s highvoltage capacitors to Chinese customers.181
“From 2002 through May 2009, Maxwell . . . paid over
$2.5 million in kickback payments to officials at several
Chinese state-owned entities” through its Chinese agent.182 On
behalf of Chinese customers, the Chinese agent requested price
quotations from Maxwell SA and instructed Maxwell SA to inflate
the prices by 20%.183 Upon receiving the power equipment, the
Chinese customers paid those inflated prices to Maxwell SA.184
The Chinese agent then “invoiced [Maxwell SA] for the ‘extra’ 20
percent . . . .”185 Once the Chinese agent received these amounts,
he paid them as bribes to employees of the state-owned entities.186
As a result of these improprieties, Maxwell was subject to
enforcement actions by both the DOJ and the SEC.187 The DOJ
charged Maxwell with violating the anti-bribery provisions because
it knowingly permitted the Chinese agent to continue transferring
the extra amounts to employees of state-owned entities in return
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 169.
Id.
178 M AXWELL T ECHS ., I NC ., 2012 A NNUAL R EPORT 69 (2011), available at
http://phx.corporate-ir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9NTIzOTY4fENoaWxk
SUQ9MjA5NjIxfFR5cGU9MQ==&t=1.
179 Company Overview, MAXWELL TECHS., http://www.maxwell.com/about_us/
company-overview (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
180 Complaint ¶ 2, SEC v. Maxwell Techs., Inc., No. 1:11-cr-00258 (D.D.C. Jan.
31, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011/comp21832.pdf.
181 Information ¶ 11, United States v. Maxwell Techs., Inc., No. 3:11-cr-00329
(S.D. Cal. 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/maxwell/0131-11maxwell-tech-info.pdf.
182 Complaint ¶ 2, SEC v. Maxwell Techs., Inc., No. 1:11-cr-00258.
183 Information ¶ 16 United States v. Maxwell Techs., Inc., No. 3:11-cr-00329.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Maxwell
Technologies for Long-Running Bribery Scheme in China (Jan. 31, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-31.htm.
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for business.188 Further, the DOJ charged Maxwell with violating
the books and records provision by recording these improper
payments as commissions, and by labeling them “Extra Amount”
or “Special Arrangement.”189
The SEC charged Maxwell with violating the internal
controls provision, because Maxwell failed to determine why
the contract prices were artificially inflated, failed to mandate
FCPA training for certain employees, and because senior
officers and managers did not stop improprieties of which they
were aware.190 Finally, the SEC charged Maxwell with violating
Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act by recording the bribes “as
sales commission expenses in its financials.”191
Maxwell entered into a deferred prosecution agreement
with the DOJ.192 Under the agreement, the DOJ agreed not to
prosecute Maxwell for three years and seven calendar days.193
Further, the DOJ agreed to release Maxwell from criminal
liability after that time as long as Maxwell complies with the
agreement.194 In exchange, Maxwell must continue cooperating
with the DOJ in any ongoing investigation “relating to corrupt
payments, related false books and records, and inadequate
internal controls.”195 Maxwell must also continue implementing a
compliance program “designed to prevent and detect violations of
the FCPA and other applicable anti-corruption laws.”196 Finally,
Maxwell must review its internal controls, improving and
supplementing them as necessary.197
Maxwell also reached a settlement with the SEC, in which
it “consented to the entry of a final judgment that permanently
enjoins the company from future violations of” Section 13(a) of the
Exchange Act, and the anti-bribery, books and records, and
internal controls provisions of the FCPA.198 Moreover, Maxwell

188
189
190

Information, supra note 181, ¶¶ 20-21.
Id. ¶¶ 22-23.
Complaint ¶ 27, SEC v. Maxwell Techs., Inc., No. 1:11-cr-00258 (D.D.C. Jan.

31, 2011).
Id. ¶¶ 32-35.
Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Maxwell Techs., Inc., No.
3:11-cr-00329 (S.D. Cal. 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/
maxwell/01-31-11maxwell-tech-dpa.pdf.
193 Id. ¶ 3.
194 Id. ¶ 9.
195 Id. ¶ 5.
196 Id. ¶ 10.
197 Id. ¶ 11.
198 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 187.
191
192
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agreed to disgorge approximately $5.6 million in ill-gotten gains
and pay nearly $700,000 in prejudgment interest.199
V.

TOWARD A RECONCEIVED LEGISLATIVE INTENT

The preceding parts of this note have described the
development and present-day reality of FCPA enforcement. Part I
provided a brief history of the FCPA, which became law after
hundreds of U.S. companies admitted to paying more than $300
million in overseas bribes. Part II concluded from examining the
legislative history that a reflexive conviction that bribery is
morally reprehensible sat uneasily alongside the facilitating
payments exception. This exception reflects the moral ambiguity
surrounding bribery, the concern that the United States was
imposing its normative standards on other countries, and the
belief that certain, arguably de minimis, forms of bribery
ultimately were necessary.
Part III recognized that the cultural notions of guanxi
and mianzi are deeply rooted in Chinese culture and invariably
affect how individuals do business. Part IV elaborated on the
abstract descriptions in Part III by providing examples of
behavior that without question was informed by guanxi and
mianzi, and that led to charges of violating the FCPA and the
Exchange Act. In China, payments and gifts outside the
boundaries of rules and regulations often are not seen as
immoral, which further underscores the difficulty of relying on
moral intuitions.
This part considers two examples of corruption in China
that have threatened public health and safety. These incidents
raise the possibility that overseas corruption could one day
harm American consumers. Given the trade relationship between
the United States and China, this risk will only increase with
time. Next, this part argues in favor of recognizing a public-safety
rationale for prohibiting foreign bribery. Recognizing a publicsafety rationale suggests two reforms. First, the prohibition of
foreign bribery should be expanded to include all recipients.
Second, to mitigate increases in compliance costs and decrease
uncertainty, the FCPA should include a compliance defense that
operates as a matter of law. In addition to suggesting specific
reforms, the public-safety rationale provides a reconceived
legislative intent behind the FCPA, which will be necessary to
amend it.
199
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Threats to Public Health and Safety

In recent years, China has attracted criticism for
scandals that illustrate the dangers of an at-all-costs approach
to business and economic growth. Not infrequently, this
approach has had devastating consequences for public health and
safety. Two examples are the bribery scandal that engulfed
China’s State Food and Drug Administration, which led to the
execution of Zheng Xiaoyu, its director, and the high-speed train
collision in Wenzhou in 2011.
For eight years, Zheng Xiaoyu led the State Food and
Drug Administration, an agency that he lobbied to create.200
During that time, eight drug companies showered him with
bribes and gifts including a house, a car, cash, and stock,201
together worth more than $850,000.202 During his tenure,
Zheng approved more than 150,000 new drugs—a rate of
nearly 19,000 new drugs per year.203 By contrast, the Food and
Drug Administration approved only 35 new drugs in 2012.204 As
a result of Zheng’s improprieties, 14 people died and hundreds
possibly were injured after using Xinfu, an unsafe antibiotic.205
In July 2011, one high-speed train collided with a train
ahead of it, killing 40 people and injuring 172.206 Both trains had
departed Beijing for the eastern city of Fuzhou.207 After
concluding its investigation, the Chinese government attributed
the accident to problematic track-signal equipment, which
stopped working after being struck by lightning.208 The
government’s report found several dozen additional instances of
faulty equipment, which “called into question how the signal
contracts were awarded in the first place.”209 One journalist who
200 David Barboza, A Chinese Reformer Betrays His Cause, and Pays, N.Y. TIMES,
July 13, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/13/business/worldbusiness/
13corrupt.html.
201 Id.
202 Jonathan Watts, China Executes Former Food Safety Chief Over Fake
Medicines, GUARDIAN, July 10, 2007, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/jul/
11/china.jonathanwatts. The bribes and gifts were worth $6.5 million Chinese yuan, then
equivalent to $858,000. See Historical Exchange Rates, OANDA, http://www.oanda.com/
currency/historical-rates (last visited Mar. 1, 2014) (providing an average Chinese yuan to
U.S. dollar exchange rate of 0.1321 in July 2007).
203 Barboza, supra note 200.
204 FDA, FY 2012 INNOVATIVE DRUG APPROVALS 4 (2012), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/aboutfda/reportsmanualsforms/reports/ucm330859.pdf.
205 Barboza, supra note 200 (see slides 2 and 6 in accompanying slideshow).
206 James T. Areddy, China Blasts High-Speed Rail System, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 29,
2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204632204577126121683353312.html.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Id.
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investigated China’s Rail Ministry after the accident catalogued
the widespread use of illegal subcontracting: “A single contract
could be divvied up and sold for kickbacks, then sold again and
again, until it reached the bottom of a food chain of labor, where
the workers were cheap and unskilled.”210 For example, in
November 2011, “a former cook with no engineering experience
was found to be building a high-speed railway bridge using a crew
of unskilled migrant laborers who substituted crushed stones for
cement in the foundation.”211
B.

The Public-Safety Rationale for Prohibiting Foreign
Bribery

Given the trade relationship between the United States
and China, and despite safety and quality control laws in the
United States, the risk that problems in the supply chain will
harm American consumers will only increase with time. For
this reason, it is useful to supplant the moral ambiguity
surrounding the FCPA with a consequentialist rationale for
prohibiting bribery. That is, we can view bribery as morally
objectionable—or, at least, as something that ought to be
prohibited—because it can lead to significant dangers to public
health and safety.
1. How the FCPA Ought to Be Reformed
Recognizing a public-safety rationale for prohibiting
bribery suggests that the FCPA ought to be reformed.
Reasonable minds can differ as to what reforms are
appropriate. One possibility, however, is that the FCPA should
prohibit bribing not only foreign government officials, but
anyone at all. Expanding the statute in this manner is not
without precedent. For example, the United Kingdom’s Bribery
Act 2010—which applies to persons “ordinarily resident” in the
United Kingdom and to companies that are based in, or that do
business in, the United Kingdom—prohibits both giving bribes,
no matter the recipient, as well as receiving them.212 Such a
210 Evan Osnos, Boss Rail: The Disaster That Exposed the Underside of the
Boom, NEW YORKER, Oct. 22, 2012, available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/
2012/10/22/121022fa_fact_osnos.
211 Id.
212 See AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP, UK BRIBERY ACT RAISES THE
BAR ON FCPA STANDARDS FOR ANTIBRIBERY COMPLIANCE 1-2 (2010), available at
http://cdn.akingump.com/images/content/6/7/v2/6732/100802-UK-Bribery-Act-Raisesthe-Bar-on-FCPA-Standards-for-Antib.pdf.
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change to the FCPA is consistent with the public-safety
rationale because it recognizes that any bribe is a potential
source of devastating harm, and it is of no moment who the
recipient is.
In addition to prohibiting foreign bribery no matter the
recipient, the FCPA should also include a compliance defense.
The argument, as Professor Koehler puts it, is that a “company’s
pre-existing compliance policies and procedures, and its good faith
efforts to comply with the FCPA, should be relevant as a matter of
law when a non-executive employee or agent acts contrary to
those policies and procedures and in violation of the FCPA.”213
Unfortunately, the DOJ and SEC oppose such a compliance
defense.214 It remains that the two agencies have sole discretion
on whether to prosecute, and the degree to which they will
recognize efforts to comply with the FCPA.215
A compliance defense that is not subject to the whims of
prosecutorial discretion would be a welcome companion to the
first reform, i.e., expanding the prohibition of bribery to all
recipients. The DOJ and SEC have already given detailed
guidance on what makes a compliance program robust and
appropriate to a given company.216 But they should go further to
decrease uncertainty, and assure the business community that
compliance programs will be taken into account when
investigating potential FCPA violations. Expanding the
prohibition of foreign bribery may increase compliance costs, but a
compliance defense would mitigate this increase by enabling
companies to better manage compliance risk elsewhere.
2. A Reconceived Legislative Intent for Reforms to the
FCPA
The public-safety rationale for prohibiting bribery not
only suggests certain reforms, but also serves as a reconceived
legislative intent for them. This is necessary because reforms
tied to public health and safety will likely require legislative
action in the form of a third set of amendments to the FCPA. As
for the two reforms mentioned above, both the DOJ’s and SEC’s
213 Mike Koehler, Revisiting a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance
Defense, 2 WIS. L. REV. 609, 611 (2012) (emphases in original).
214 Id. at 651.
215 Id. (quoting Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, &
Homeland Security, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 5 (2011) (written testimony
of the Hon. Michael B. Mukasey)).
216 RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 2, at 56-65.
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guidance217 and the current enforcement environment make clear
that such changes simply are not in the offing.
CONCLUSION
When it comes to the FCPA, China has proved to be a
source of both problems and solutions. The cultural notions of
guanxi and mianzi present significant obstacles for U.S.
companies, which, given the risk of steep fines and negative
publicity, want to ensure that their Chinese subsidiaries do not
violate the FCPA. In the face of these obstacles, however,
recent high-profile incidents in China that affect public health
and safety raise the possibility that overseas corruption could one
day harm American consumers. Recognizing a public-safety
rationale for prohibiting bribery abroad addresses the moral
ambiguity surrounding the original passage of the FCPA, and
suggests that it ought to be reformed. This note has argued for
one possible set of reforms—expanding the prohibition of foreign
bribery to all recipients, while decreasing uncertainty and
controlling compliance costs with a compliance defense that
operates as a matter of law, and is not subject to prosecutorial
discretion. Further, the public-safety rationale provides a
reconceived legislative intent that will be necessary to
implement these reforms through an amendment to the FCPA.
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